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INTRODUCTION
In Krieg v. Seybold,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit asserted that Robert Krieg—a dump truck, front end
loader, and backhoe operator—had a “safety-sensitive” job, and that
the City of Marion, Indiana, could therefore test his urine for evidence
of drug use. Normally, the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures requires a public employer to have
a reasonable and individualized suspicion that an employee has used
illegal drugs before that employer can require him to submit to drug
testing. But the City of Marion claimed, and the Seventh Circuit
agreed, that a “safety” exception to this requirement should expand to
cover Krieg’s job in the Department of Streets and Sanitation. Thus,
the City could test Krieg for drugs on a random basis.

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. With special thanks to Professor David S. Rudstein, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, whose course entitled Criminal Procedure: The Investigatory
Process provided the author with the necessary background to undertake this project.
1
481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The Supreme Court established this safety exception in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n2 and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab.3 In these cases, the Court held that certain jobs
created significant safety concerns in circumstances where it would be
impractical to require an employer to develop individualized
suspicion. Thus, the jobs created “special” governmental needs, and
these needs eliminated the presumption that a suspicionless search is
unreasonable.
The Seventh Circuit should have explained in detail why Krieg’s
job as a heavy equipment operator raised sufficient safety concerns to
fall within this exception. Next, it should have explained why the
circumstances surrounding Krieg’s job made it impractical for the City
to use a suspicion-based drug testing program to address these
concerns.
Instead, the court read Skinner and Von Raab to create a bright
line rule that all employees whose jobs create serious safety concerns
are excluded from the normal protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Even if the Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted Skinner and Von
Raab, it failed to create a principled reason why heavy equipment
operators are safety-sensitive employees within the meaning of those
cases. This failure jeopardizes the Fourth Amendment protection
against suspicionless searches because labeling jobs such as Krieg’s as
“safety-sensitive” leaves little room outside the safety exception for
any kind of blue-collar labor.
Part I below provides background information about the normal
requirements of the Fourth Amendment as they apply to public
employers. Part II explains the reasoning of the Krieg case, showing
that the Seventh Circuit employed a bright line rule with regard to
safety-sensitive employees. Part III argues that the Supreme Court has
not adopted a bright line rule excepting safety-sensitive employees
from normal Fourth Amendment protections, in the way that the Krieg
court claims it has. Part IV explains why the Krieg court was not

2
3

489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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compelled to hold that Krieg’s position was safety-sensitive and why
its choice to do so gives the error in Krieg a far-reaching effect.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS DO NOT NEED A WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures by government agents,4 and requires that
warrants for searches or seizures be supported by probable cause.5 The
Supreme Court has explained that the Fourth Amendment serves at
least the following purposes: First, the protection against unreasonable
searches protects citizens against intrusions on their privacy where
those intrusions are not justified at the outset by some legitimate
governmental interest.6 Second, the protection against unreasonable
seizures of persons protects citizens from unjustified restraints on their

4

See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-16 (private employers can be subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment when they act with the “encouragement,
endorsement, and participation” of a State or federal actor). In a Fourth Amendment
analysis, it is typical to proceed by first determining whether the challenged intrusion
was carried out by a government actor, then to determine whether it was a “search”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and then to determine whether that
search was reasonable under whatever framework applies to the situation at issue.
See, e.g., id. at 613-19.
5
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
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freedom of movement.7 Third, the protection against unreasonable
seizures protects citizens’ possessory interests in their property from
infringement by government agents, unless such infringement is
justified.8
Next, the requirement of a warrant ensures that some neutral body
(normally a magistrate) evaluates the character of the intrusion on one
of the above interests and determines whether this intrusion is justified
before the actual intrusion occurs.9 The neutral body will also
determine the scope of the justified intrusion by describing the
persons, places, and things to be affected.10 Finally, the requirement
that a warrant be supported by probable cause sets a uniform measure
below which an intrusion will not be justified.11 By creating a high
threshold,12 it has the effect of weighting the balance of interests
between citizen and government strongly in favor of the citizen.
The Supreme Court has decided, however, that warrants are not
always required. It has created exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant for searches that are part of a lawful arrest, for situations in
7

See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (stating that the detention of a railway
employee awaiting a drug test may be a seizure if it “amounts to a meaningful
interference with his freedom of movement”).
8
See, e.g., id. at 617 n.4 (stating that the taking of a urine sample might be a
seizure if it creates a “meaningful interference with the employee’s possessory
interest in his bodily fluids”).
9
Id. at 621-22.
10
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants “particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”).
11
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“The longprevailing standard of probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,’ while giving ‘fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“Except in
certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it
is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”)
(citations omitted).
12
See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (defining probable cause as a “reasonable
ground for belief of guilt” which is “particularized with respect to the person to be
searched”) (citations omitted).
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which police or other officials must act quickly to prevent physical
harm or the destruction of evidence, and for various other
circumstances.13 Each of these exceptions allows government agents
to conduct searches or seizures without a warrant, but these acts still
must be justified by probable cause.14
In a different category are searches conducted by government
agents who are not acting in a law enforcement capacity.15 Searches of
this kind include, among others, residential housing inspections,16
inventory searches of impounded vehicles,17 and searches that take
place in public schools.18 These searches often do not require a
13

See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (limited exception for
searches of automobiles), abrogated on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993); the line of cases following Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances).
14
See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (describing the
rationale of Hayden); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 754-55 (the
arrest underlying an incident search must be supported by probable cause). There are
exceptions to this rule that are beyond the scope of this article. For example, some
searches, such as a limited search for weapons, are conducted without a warrant and
can be justified by a lesser degree of individualized suspicion than probable cause.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In addition, sobriety and border-control
checkpoints involve brief seizures for law enforcement purposes that are permissible
despite their suspicionless nature. These seizures are limited in nature because they
allow an officer to look for only one type of information, for example immigration
documents, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), or indications
that a driver might be intoxicated, Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990). When an officer wishes to engage in more extensive sobriety testing than
“preliminary questioning and observation,” the Fourth Amendment may require
“individualized suspicion.” Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51. In any event, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the cases regarding checkpoints and other brief lawenforcement stops are of a different category than the line of cases under Von Raab.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (rejecting motorists’ claim that the Von Raab standard
should apply and that the State police must therefore show a special governmental
need that justifies departure from the general rule of individual suspicion).
15
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
16
E.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17
E.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
18
E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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warrant, and may require a lesser degree of suspicion than probable
cause19 or even no suspicion at all.20
The Supreme Court has not placed drug testing in the workplace
in any of the above categories.21 Instead, it has created yet another
category that is unique to the public workplace environment.
Therefore, a public employer is able to test its employees for drug use
when that employer reasonably suspects that such drug use has
occurred.22 It may not test all employees, but only those whom it
suspects on an individual basis.23 This rule reflects a balance between
governmental and personal interests that is unique to adult citizens
working on behalf of their government.24 It is a balance that favors the
employee, but the Supreme Court has further held that this balance
may shift—creating an even scale—in certain situations. Such a
situation arises where the capacity in which the citizen works is
particularly safety-sensitive and the nature of the workplace makes the
19

Id. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing
any specific class of searches requires ‘balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37)); id. at
341 (“Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and
seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of
probable cause.”) (citations omitted).
20
E.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373-76 (routine inventory searches).
21
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990)
(distinguishing from the line of cases regarding sobriety checkpoints and other brief
law-enforcement stops); see also L. Camille Hebert, Early Fourth Amendment
Challenges to Drug Testing, 1 EMP. PRIVACY LAW § 3:4 (June 2007) (explaining
that prior to Skinner and Von Raab some federal circuit courts characterized
workplace drug testing as an administrative search similar to those applicable to
businesses that participate in closely regulated industries).
22
See infra Part III. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Supreme
Court explains this standard of individualized suspicion in the law enforcement
context as a reasonable conclusion, based on inferences drawn from the facts of the
situation and from the officer’s own experience, that his safety or the safety of others
is in danger.
23
Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007).
24
Compare Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
and Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) with T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325.
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general requirement of individual suspicion impractical. In such cases,
the Fourth Amendment may allow for random drug testing. The
Supreme Court created this second measure of permissible employer
conduct in the cases of Skinner and Von Raab.25
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATES A BRIGHT LINE RULE
The Seventh Circuit case of Krieg v. Seybold 26 was rooted in this
second measure of permissible employer conduct. In that case, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court had
granted summary judgment to the City of Marion, Indiana, in an action
challenging the City’s random drug testing policy.27
Robert Krieg had been an employee of the City’s Department of
Streets and Sanitation since 1985, and was a union member.28 Under
the collective bargaining agreement for the years 2003-2004,
employees were subject to drug testing based upon reasonable
suspicion, and were also subject to such testing following workplace
accidents. The bargaining agreement incorporated a personnel
handbook, and that handbook provided for random drug testing of all
“safety-sensitive” employees.29
Krieg was a “driver/laborer,” which meant that he sometimes
operated large equipment such as a one-ton dump truck, a dump truck
with a plow, a front end loader, and a backhoe, but he did not have a
commercial driver’s license (CDL)30 and these vehicles were not
commercial motor vehicles. Therefore, Krieg did not fall within the
definition of “safety-sensitive” that was set forth in the City’s
handbook. When the City required Krieg to submit to a drug test in
2002 and he tested positive for marijuana, the City admitted that it
25

See infra Part III.
481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007).
27
Id. at 516; Krieg v. Seybold, 427 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
28
Krieg, 481 F.3d at 514.
29
Id. at 514-15.
30
Id.
26
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should not have tested Krieg under its current policies.31 In 2004,
however, the City unilaterally changed its testing policies. It redefined
“safety-sensitive” to include “any duty related to the safe operation of
City equipment.” The City employees refused to consent to this
change and objected to it as one about which the City should have
negotiated with the union.32
Later that year, without any prior notice and without resolving the
employees’ concerns regarding the new drug testing policy, the City
required all employees of the Department of Streets and Sanitation to
submit to immediate drug tests.33 Any employee who refused would be
terminated.34 When Krieg refused to submit to the test and tried to call
his attorney, his boss told him to leave the building because he was
fired. He also threatened to call the police when Krieg did not leave
right away.35 The City Board of Works later officially fired Krieg, after
a meeting about the incident.36
Krieg—together with the union—filed a complaint in district
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.37 Krieg alleged violations of both the
Fourth Amendment and his Due Process right to certain termination
procedures. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the City.38 The Seventh Circuit affirmed its judgment as to both
claims, but this note will focus only on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis
of the Fourth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the general rule that
“drug testing must be based upon individualized suspicion.”39 It then
looked to Von Raab for the proposition that “random drug testing is
constitutionally permissible when it ‘serves special governmental
31

Id. at 515.
Id.
33
See id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 515-16.
36
Id. at 516.
37
See id.
38
Id.; Krieg v. Seybold, 427 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
39
Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997)).
32
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needs.’”40 “Special needs” is a shorthand for the Supreme Court’s
assertion that in certain circumstances a search will serve an important
enough governmental interest that it can be conducted despite the
absence of a warrant and probable cause.41 The asserted need must be
something more than the “normal need for law enforcement”42—
therefore government agents such as public employers and school
officials often invoke the special needs doctrine to justify searches.43
However, a special need is not sufficient on its own to justify a
departure from the normal requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, as the Krieg court properly explained, “when such a special
need exists, courts should ‘balance the individual’s privacy
expectations against the government’s interests to determine whether it
is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context.’”44 As will be shown below, the
Seventh Circuit did not adhere to this last requirement. Not only did
the court fail to determine whether requiring the City of Marion to
show “some level of individualized suspicion” would be
“impractical,” it also failed to point to a single reason why the City
could not have complied with that requirement.
In short, the Seventh Circuit treated Von Raab as if it created
bright line rule that a special need could—by itself—justify drug
testing without suspicion.45 As will be shown in Part III, below, the
Supreme Court has never condoned such a rule.

40

Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989)).
41
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
42
Id.
43
See infra Part III for more on the requirements of the special needs doctrine
and on how the Supreme Court has applied this doctrine to employers versus to
school officials.
44
Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665).
45
See id. (“However, the Supreme Court has held that random drug testing is
constitutionally permissible when it ‘serves special governmental needs . . . .’”
(quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665)).
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A. The Seventh Circuit’s Definition of a Special Need
To determine whether a special need existed in Marion, Indiana,
the Seventh Circuit asserted that “a special need exists when the
government employee subjected to random drug testing holds a ‘safety
sensitive’ position.”46 It then set forth the following test, relying on
Skinner: “To determine whether an employee occupies a safety
sensitive position, courts must inquire whether the employee’s duties
were ‘fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous
consequences.’”47
The court looked to several cases from other courts that had
interpreted this definition of “safety-sensitive.” According to the Krieg
court, lower federal courts had held that duties such as operating
forklifts, tractors, cranes, and other types of heavy equipment satisfied
the Skinner definition.48 The court also explained that lower courts had
rejected claims that public employees such as mail van drivers, shuttle
bus drivers, and passenger car drivers held safety-sensitive positions.49
The Seventh Circuit held that because Krieg operated “large
vehicles and equipment” and these could “present a substantial risk of
injury to others if operated by an employee under the influence of
drugs or alcohol,” Krieg “performed a safety sensitive job.”50 His job
raised greater safety concerns than those of van and passenger car
drivers because Krieg’s equipment was “larger and more difficult to
operate.”51 Finally, the court emphasized that Krieg operated his
equipment “in the City near other vehicles and pedestrians” rather than
46

Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630).
Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628) (bracketed material in original).
48
Id. at 518.
49
Id. (referring to Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp.
766 (D.D.C. 1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Lyng, 706 F. Supp. 934
(D.D.C. 1988)).
50
Id. (Krieg “regularly operated a one-ton dump truck, a dump truck with a
plow, a front end loader, and a backhoe”).
51
Id.
47

376
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12

10

Lobelle: <em>Krieg v. Seybold</em>: The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Bright Li

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

in “rural areas.”52 Thus, the court held, “any reasonable jury would
conclude that Krieg’s job duties” were safety-sensitive within the
meaning of Skinner.53
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Balancing Test Demonstrates That It Adopted
a Bright Line Rule
Next, the Seventh Circuit balanced the “intrusion on [Krieg’s]
Fourth Amendment interests” against the extent to which the City’s
drug testing program would promote a “legitimate governmental
interest.”54 It considered these factors:
1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
search intrudes, 2) the character of the intrusion on the
individuals’ privacy interest, 3) the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and 4)
the efficacy of the particular means used to address the
problem.55
Based on these factors, it held that the City of Marion had
“shown a governmental interest sufficient to justify submitting
Krieg to random, suspicionless drug testing.”56
Though engaging in a balancing test once it had identified a
special governmental need was consistent with the requirement of Von
Raab (mentioned above),57 the court here relied on Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton and on the Seventh Circuit case of Joy v. PennHarris-Madison School Corp. to explain the test.58 Each of these two
52

Id.
Id.
54
Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
55
Id. (citing Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
56
Id. at 519.
57
See id. at 517.
58
Id. at 518 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059).
53
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cases dealt with randomly testing schoolchildren for drug use. As
explained in Part III below, randomly drug testing schoolchildren
implicates a different body of Supreme Court precedent than does
randomly drug testing adults.59 Setting forth the balancing test under
these two school cases, the court simply asserted that it should
consider the factors above. It did not mention—even though it had
recognized as much when it set forth the special needs test under Von
Raab, one page earlier—that the purpose of its balancing test should
have been to determine whether it was impractical to require “some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”60
The court’s treatment of each factor further demonstrates it did
not conduct this balancing test with the purpose of determining
whether the City was justified in departing from the general rule
requiring individual suspicion. The court held that the nature of
Krieg’s privacy interest was diminished because he had submitted to
drug testing on a previous occasion.61 It then rejected Krieg’s claim
that the character of the intrusion was “severe” because the City did
not follow its own testing policy.62 This claim centered on whether
choosing a random date on which to test an entire Department was
truly “random, suspicionless drug testing.”63 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the City had complied with its own policy.64 Clearly,
neither of these arguments or conclusions relate to whether testing
Department employees only when the City had reason to suspect they
had used drugs would be impractical. Instead, the court’s consideration
of these two factors related only to the degree of intrusion on Krieg’s
privacy interests.65
59

See infra Part III.
Compare Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 with id. at 518.
61
Id. at 518-19. As mentioned earlier, the prior program was aimed at CDL
holders. Krieg does not have a CDL, and the City conceded that it was improper to
test him under that program. Id. at 515.
62
Id. at 519.
63
See id.
64
Id.
65
It was not improper for the court to consider only the intrusion on individual
privacy when it evaluated these first two factors. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor
60
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The court next addressed the nature and immediacy of the City’s
need for the drug testing program. “[T]he City [had] a compelling
interest in ensuring that its employees who regularly drive large
equipment around the City are not impaired by drugs or alcohol.”66
With regard to the immediacy of the need, the court claimed that it
was irrelevant that the City had not shown a “history of drug-related
accidents by non-CDL holders” (such as Krieg) because the Supreme
Court “has not required” such a showing.67 Even if it is true that the
Supreme Court has not so required, the purpose of balancing these
factors should have been to determine whether it would be impractical
to impose a similar requirement.68 The Seventh Circuit did not address
any practical concerns in its treatment of this factor.
With regard to the final factor—the efficacy of the means chosen
by the City to address its legitimate governmental concern—the court
rejected Krieg’s claim that the City must “demonstrate that it could not
address the problem by observing Department employees for
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-28 (1989) (analyzing the intrusion on railroad
employees’ privacy and contrasting these “limited threats” with “the Government
interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion”). However, at
some point during this balancing test, the court should have considered the
practicality of a suspicion-based testing program. The court’s failure in this regard is
demonstrated below.
66
Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519.
67
Id. The court cites to Board of Education of Independent School District No.
92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835 (2002) for the claim that the Supreme Court does not
require a showing of a “particularized or pervasive drug problem” in order to justify
suspicionless drug testing. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519. But Earls is also a case about
testing schoolchildren for drug use, not about testing adults. Nevertheless, the Von
Raab Court did allow the Customs Service to employ a program of suspicionless
drug testing even though the Service had not shown a pervasive drug problem
among its (adult) employees. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 673-74 (1989). See more on this issue infra Part III.
68
While the practicality question under Von Raab is whether the City could
have formed some level of individualized suspicion, suspicion based on a history of
drug use among the group targeted for random testing would at least have been
closer to such a threshold. Instead, the court here upholds a program of testing
persons whom the City has absolutely no reason to suspect of drug use—either
individually or as a group.
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suspicious behavior.”69 This is the only time in its balancing test that
the court mentioned the practicality of requiring some level of
suspicion. The court’s response, however, was that “neither the
Supreme Court nor this Court has ever held that this showing is a
requirement of imposing random drug tests.”70 It may be true that
neither court has ever required this specific showing. However (as will
be shown in Part III below), the Supreme Court has required some
reason that developing individual suspicion would be impractical.71 If
the Seventh Circuit did ascertain such a reason in this case, it did not
share that reason with its readers.
Thus, in this brief opinion, the Seventh Circuit adopted a bright
line rule that safety concerns alone are sufficient to justify random,
suspicionless drug testing. Further, it showed that the court will
eschew any attempt to require a governmental body to demonstrate
that the normal requirements of the Fourth Amendment would
undermine that body’s attempt to address such safety concerns.
III. THE SUPREME COURT USES A FACT-SPECIFIC APPROACH FOR THE
PUBLIC WORKPLACE
The Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless workplace drug
testing by government agents in two cases: Skinner72 and Von Raab.73
Each of these cases involved a policy that required workplace drug
testing triggered by a certain event—a train accident and an
application for promotion, respectively—rather than by individualized
suspicion. Each case placed substantial emphasis on both the safety
concerns raised by the job at issue and the way in which the relevant
policy limited the discretion of the government agents.74 In addition,
each case emphasized that the circumstances giving rise to a need for
69

Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519.
Id. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674).
71
See infra Part III.
72
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
73
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
74
See infra Parts III(A) and III(B).
70
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drug testing justified a departure from the normal requirement of
reasonable suspicion.75
By contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a suspicionless drug
testing scheme in Chandler v. Miller,76 where the scheme was meant
to deter drug use among political candidates. The proponents of the
testing program argued that it addressed safety concerns similar to
those that justified the program in Von Raab.77 In addition, the
program was statutory, and the statute defined the persons affected, the
timing of the tests, and the process of information collection.78
Therefore, government agents would have had limited discretion in the
administration of the program. Nonetheless, the concerns the program
addressed did not arise in circumstances unusual enough to justify a
departure from the need for individualized suspicion.79
When drug testing programs target schoolchildren, however, the
Supreme Court has not required school officials to identify an unusual
circumstance that would make drug testing based upon individualized
suspicion impractical.80 Instead, it has adopted a bright line rule—
justified by and specific to the school setting—that eliminates the
presumption in favor of individualized suspicion.81 Therefore, when
evaluating drug testing programs in schools, the Supreme Court will
balance the interests of the individual and the government on an even
scale, rather than on a scale weighted in favor of the individual.
Thus, the Supreme Court has created differing rules with regard to
suspicionless drug testing for various contexts. In the context of
schools, the overriding safety concern of preventing childhood drug
use will be sufficient on its own to justify suspicionless testing, and
75

See infra Parts III(A) and III(B).
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
77
See infra Part III(C).
78
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309-10.
79
See infra Part III(C).
80
See infra Part III(D) for a discussion of the rules applicable to school
settings.
81
This is not to say that all suspicionless drug testing programs in schools will
be constitutionally permissible. A court might still consider a testing program’s
suspicionless nature when deciding whether it is reasonable. See infra Part III(D).
76
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the Court will only ask whether the particular program at issue was
reasonable. In the workplace, safety concerns have been sufficient to
justify suspicionless testing only where they arise in circumstances
that make individualized suspicion impractical. Because the testing
program in Krieg affected adults (as opposed to schoolchildren), the
Seventh Circuit should have followed the context-specific approach
used by the Supreme Court in Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler.
A. Safety, Regulation, and an Unusual Need in Skinner
In Skinner, a private railroad company was subject to regulations
promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (F.R.A.),82 and
these regulations required the company to provide the F.R.A. with
urine samples from all employees of the railroad who were directly
involved in any major train accident.83 In addition, the F.R.A.
regulations allowed railroad companies to test employees in particular
positions when certain rule violations occurred, such as
“noncompliance with a signal and excessive speeding.”84 A F.R.A.
laboratory would test these samples for drugs and for alcohol
content.85 To ensure that all employees were tested in the aftermath of
major accidents, the railroad company had to transport them directly to
a testing facility.86
The Skinner Court addressed a constitutional challenge to this
testing scheme by first determining whether the Fourth Amendment
applied to the railroad company’s acts87 and whether collection of
82

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989).
Id. at 609. The regulations also required blood samples. The Court analyzed
these separately throughout its opinion, so this article will focus only on the urine
sampling.
84
Id. at 611.
85
Id. at 610 (regarding samples taken post-accident). Samples taken after a
rule violation would be processed at an independent facility. Id. at 611.
86
Id. at 609.
87
Id. at 614-15. In these circumstances, the railroad company was a
government agent with regard to the post-accident testing. And, with regard to the
post-rule violation testing, the government was sufficiently involved in the railroad
83
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urine for testing was a search,88answering both in the affirmative.
Next, it evaluated whether the search could be reasonable in the
absence of the default threshold: a warrant and probable cause.89 It
determined that, in the circumstances presented, such searches could
be reasonable because (a) the purpose of the testing went “beyond
normal law enforcement,” creating a “special need;”90 and (b) the
purposes of the warrant requirement were satisfied by the regulations
themselves.91
The purpose of the drug testing at issue was “to prevent accidents
and casualties in railroad operations,” thus protecting the safety of “the
traveling public and of the employees.”92 As evidence of this purpose,
the Court looked in part to the categories of employees covered by the
regulations.93 These employees included persons “handling orders
concerning train movements, operating crews, and those engaged in
the maintenance and repair of signal systems.”94 Both parties conceded
that these positions required “safety-sensitive tasks.”95
The Court did not assume that the “special need” created by this
safety purpose and by the safety-sensitive nature of the employees’
tasks would automatically allow government agents to search
employees without a warrant. Instead, it examined the purposes of the
warrant requirement to decide whether that requirement should apply
in the particular circumstances before it. It defined these purposes as:
company’s acts where it “removed all legal barriers to the testing,” had a “strong
preference” that the company conduct such testing, and “share[d] the fruits of such
intrusions.” Id. at 615.
88
Id. at 617. The Court in Vernonia began in the same way, i.e., by
determining that the Fourth Amendment protections reached public school officials
and that compelled urinalysis constituted a search. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
89
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
90
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
91
Id. at 621-24.
92
Id. at 620-21.
93
Id. at 620.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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to assure citizens that searches are not “random or arbitrary acts of
government agents;” to ensure that searches are narrow in both
objective and scope; and to allow a neutral, objective magistrate to
determine whether a search is justified in each particular case.96The
F.R.A. regulations satisfied these purposes 97 because they specifically
defined the narrow objectives and scope of the drug testing program,
and because they were well-known to the employees affected.98 In
addition, the regulations left “minimal discretion” to the persons who
would administer the search.99
Even though the Skinner Court had thus determined that the
railroad company’s drug testing program served a special need and
that the regulations mandating the program obviated the need for a
warrant, it still had to decide whether the special need would justify a
search without suspicion.100 It characterized the circumstances in
which a search can be reasonable in the absence of any individualized
suspicion as limited to those where (a) the intrusion on the individual’s
privacy interests is minimal, (b) the government’s interests are
important, and (c) requiring suspicion would undermine the
government’s objective.101
The Court found that the intrusion on the railway workers’ privacy
was minimal because the collection environment was similar to a
routine medical examination, and because the regulations limited the
private facts revealed to those related to alcohol or drug use.102 The

96

Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 624.
98
Id. at 622. The Court also looked to the way that requiring a warrant would
frustrate the objectives of the government in conducting the search. Here, the
objective was to help determine whether drugs were a factor in a major train
accident. Waiting for a warrant could allow evidence of these substances to
metabolize out of the bodily fluids of the involved employees. Id. at 623.
99
Id. at 622.
100
Id. at 624.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 626-27. The testing procedures would also include information about
any other medications that the employees were taking. The Court assumed in its
97

384
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12

18

Lobelle: <em>Krieg v. Seybold</em>: The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Bright Li

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

Court emphasized that the workers knew that their industry involved
many regulations to ensure safety and that these regulations frequently
dealt with employee health and fitness.103 Further, it emphasized that
many companies in the railway industry required routine physical
examinations, such as eye exams, for some groups of employees.104
Thus, the workers had a diminished expectation of privacy.105
The government’s interest in safety was important because of the
danger presented by even a “momentary lapse of attention” by a
person in the covered employees’ position.106 Therefore, the Court
would not impose a requirement of reasonable suspicion if it would
“seriously impede” the government’s objective. The Court gave three
reasons that a requirement of reasonable suspicion would impede the
government’s objective in these circumstances. First, an “impaired
employee” would not show signs of impairment that an ordinary
person could detect.107 Second, an investigator at the “chaotic” scene
of a train accident would have difficulty determining who was
responsible for the accident.108 Third, likewise, the time required to
determine which of the individuals responsible for a rule violation
might have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol would create
a risk that the evidence available through urinalysis would metabolize
and be lost.109 Thus, because of the particular difficulties of the
circumstances giving rise to the need for drug testing, it would be
“unrealistic” to require the railroad company to develop individualized
suspicion of drug use prior to administering the tests.110

analysis that this information would be used only to prevent false positives and
would be kept confidential. Id. at 626 n.7.
103
Id. at 627-28.
104
Id. at 627 & n.8.
105
Id. at 627.
106
Id. at 628.
107
Id. at 628-29.
108
Id. at 631.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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Only after it had thus considered whether the asserted special
need of railroad safety would justify a departure from the requirement
of individualized suspicion did the Skinner Court go on to determine
whether the particular scheme of suspicionless tests required by the
regulations was reasonable. For this inquiry, it looked to the efficacy
of the means chosen by the F.R.A.111 Because the F.R.A. had
“expressly considered various alternatives” and “reasonably found
them wanting,”112 the Court held that it would not independently
determine whether less intrusive means for obtaining evidence of drug
or alcohol use were available.113 Therefore, the drug testing required
by the F.R.A. regulations was reasonable.114
B. Safety, Uniform Policy, and an Unusual Need in Von Raab
The Court in Von Raab undertook a similar analysis when it
addressed a challenge by the National Treasury Employees Union to
the Customs Service’s policy of requiring a drug test from all
applicants for promotion to positions that required carrying firearms or
involved enforcing laws regarding illegal drugs.115
It began by determining whether a warrant was required. It stated
that, because the purpose of the program was to “deter drug use among
those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions,” the program
served a special governmental need.116 Once it found this special need,
it was “necessary” to “balance the individual’s privacy expectations
against the Government’s interest to determine whether it [was]

111

Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 629 n.9.
113
The court below asserted that the tests themselves were unreliable, but the
Skinner Court held that the drug test need not provide conclusive proof of drug use
in order to be reasonable. Id. at 631-32.
114
Id. at 633-34.
115
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Also
at issue was the testing of employees who would handle classified materials. Id. at
661. The Court did not resolve the issue as to this group. Id. at 677-78.
116
Id. at 666.
112
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impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context.”117
Thus, the Von Raab Court did not discuss the purposes of the
warrant requirement in such depth as did the Skinner Court, but
instead assumed that “some level of individualized suspicion” could
be sufficient to meet the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.118The
Von Raab Court concluded that requiring a warrant would be
impractical because it would divert resources without creating any
additional protection for the applicants. The interests protected by the
warrant requirement were already satisfied because the testing policy
was well-known to the applicants and left no room for discretion as to
who would be tested.119
The Von Raab Court also did not use Skinner’s language regarding
the circumstances in which testing without suspicion could be
permissible. However, it set forth a similar principle: suspicionless
tests are constitutional in “certain limited circumstances” where there
is a “compelling” governmental need that will “justify the intrusion on
privacy.”120 In the Von Raab formulation, such compelling needs exist
when the government must “discover . . . latent or hidden conditions”
or “prevent their development.”121 This portion of the Von Raab
standard addresses concerns similar to those in the Skinner test
above122 because, clearly, requiring individualized suspicion of

117

Id. at 665-66.
See id.
119
Id. at 666-67.
120
Id. at 668. The full standard is: “[I]n certain limited circumstances, the
Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed
by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.” Id.
121
Id.
122
Supra Part III(A). Suspicionless searches can be reasonable if (a) the
intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests is minimal, (b) the government’s
interests are important, and (c) requiring suspicion would undermine the
government’s objective. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
624 (1989).
118

387
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 12

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

wrongdoing would frustrate the objective of discovering hidden crimes
or preventing criminal patterns that had not yet developed.
The Von Raab Court thus upheld the Custom Service’s
suspicionless drug testing policy123 where (1) the applicants expected
inquiry into their fitness with regard to judgment and dexterity;124 (2)
the safety and national security risks of promoting drug users to
positions involving firearms and controlled substance enforcement
were “extraordinary;”125 (3) the nature of the job did not permit dayto-day supervision that would allow authorities to detect
impairment;126 and (4) the government had a “compelling interest” in
preventing even off-duty drug use by its applicants.127
The Von Raab Court recited each of these circumstances as part of
a larger inquiry into whether the interests of the government would
outweigh those of the individual applicants.128 Therefore, the Von
Raab decision might not require that lower courts consider each of the
factors implicated by these circumstances: the expectations of the
applicants, the magnitude of the safety concerns at issue, the degree of
legitimate government interest, and the practicality of suspicion-based
testing in the specific work environment at issue.129 However, at least
this much is clear: the Von Raab Court did not hold that safety
concerns on their own would suffice to justify suspicionless testing,
and it did not hold anything with regard to random drug testing.

123

Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
Id. at 672.
125
Id. at 674.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 677.
129
See id. at 667-677.
124
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C. The Chandler Court Rejects a Testing Program Where
Circumstances Were Not Unusual Enough
In the case of Chandler v. Miller,130 the Supreme Court struck
down a Georgia statute that required that candidates for certain state
offices pass a drug test within thirty days prior to nomination or
election.131 The Eleventh Circuit had upheld the statute by relying
upon the logic in Skinner and Von Raab: the statute served a special
governmental need.132 The court looked to the state’s interest in
ensuring that its officials could be trusted with the “ultimate
responsibility for law enforcement” and the supervision of “drug
interdiction efforts.”133 These were similar to the interests relied upon
in Von Raab: ensuring that drug interdiction personnel “are physically
fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.”134 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the state’s interests outweighed those of the
candidates.135
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the general rule,
consistent with Skinner and Von Raab, that government officials
normally must have individualized suspicion with regard to the subject
of a search before the search can be reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.136 The Court went on to explain that
“particularized exceptions” to this rule are “sometimes” permissible
when based upon a special governmental need.137 “When such ‘special
needs’ . . . are alleged,” the Court explained, “courts must undertake a
130

520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Id. at 308-10.
132
Id. at 311-12.
133
Id.
134
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
135
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 312.
136
See id. at 308, 313.
137
Id. at 313; see id. at 308 (citing to Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, and referring
to border checkpoints, sobriety checkpoints, and administrative inspections of
“closely regulated” businesses as examples of “certain limited circumstances” in
which a search may be reasonable in the absence of individual suspicion).
131
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context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and
public interests advanced by the parties.”138
This explanation of the legal framework behind the Skinner and
Von Raab safety exception makes explicit that the inquiry is “contextspecific” rather than a bright line. Though the context in Chandler
differed from that in Skinner, Von Raab, and Krieg (because the
persons to be tested were candidates for office rather than large groups
of public employees), the underlying analysis was uniform. In none of
these situations was the special governmental need in itself sufficient
to justify suspicionless testing. Courts must use a fact-specific
approach to determine whether some unusual circumstance will justify
a departure from the general rule. The Chandler Court used the
Skinner formulation to explain what circumstances provide such a
justification, namely, “where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion.”139
The Georgia statute did not address an important governmental
interest. Because concerns about candidates’ trustworthiness were
“hypothetical”—there was not an existing drug problem among this
group—the asserted special need was not “substantial” enough to
justify intruding upon recognized privacy interests in the absence of
individualized suspicion.140 The Court emphasized that while it is not
true that in all cases there must be a demonstrated drug problem before
a government agency can adopt a suspicionless drug testing program,
the existence of a drug problem can help to justify such a program.141
In addition, Georgia had not shown that requiring normal,
suspicion-based searches would jeopardize the government’s ability to
138

Id. at 314 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 668).
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
624 (1989)).
140
Id. at 318-19 (“Notably lacking in respondents’ presentation is any
indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s
main rule.”).
141
Id. at 319.
139
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meet its goal of deterring drug use among public officials.142 This was
true because the candidates worked in the public eye—in sharp
contrast to Von Raab, where the targeted group worked in a situation
in which “day-to-day scrutiny” was impossible.143 When comparing
Chandler to Von Raab, the Court further emphasized that Von Raab
did not “open[] broad vistas for suspicionless searches.”144
In sum, the Chandler Court confirmed that Skinner and Von Raab
did not create a broad rule that special safety needs will always justify
suspicionless searches. In other words, the Supreme Court has not
created a bright line rule allowing suspicionless drug testing programs
whenever such programs serve a special governmental need.
Moreover, the Court established several facts relevant to the
“context-specific” inquiry that each court must undertake before
upholding a suspicionless testing program premised on a special need.
First, situations allegedly creating safety concerns will not justify
suspicionless searches where the concerns are merely hypothetical.
Second, the existence of a drug problem is relevant to whether there is
an important governmental interest at stake. And finally, the absence
of a suspicion-based approach sufficient to address the relevant safety
concerns is key to the inquiry of whether a suspicionless program can
be justified.
D. In Schools, No Unusual Circumstance is Necessary
In contrast to the above cases regarding testing adults for drug
use, the Supreme Court has created two bright line rules regarding
drug testing in schools. First, schools present special governmental
needs. Second, the particular role of school officials as guardians over
schoolchildren justifies suspicionless drug testing programs that target
students in voluntary extracurricular activities. Therefore, the cases of
Vernonia145 and Board of Education of Independent School District
142

Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
144
Id.
145
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
143
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No. 92 v. Earls,146 dealing with suspicionless drug testing in schools,
are inappropriate sources of authority for a court to rely upon when
determining whether suspicionless drug testing in a workplace is
constitutionally permissible.
In Vernonia, the Court recognized the first of these bright line
rules—that schools present special governmental needs. In Vernonia,
student athletes challenged a policy that required them to undergo
random drug testing.147 The school administration thought athletes
were “the leaders of the drug culture” and had therefore adopted the
policy in response to a “sharp increase” in drug use in the school
district.148
The Court started with the general rule that, when law
enforcement officials try to obtain “evidence of criminal wrongdoing,”
a search will not be reasonable without a warrant supported by
probable cause.149 It then set forth the principle that “when special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable” a search can be
reasonable even though it is not supported by probable cause.150 Next,
the Court cited New Jersey v. T.L.O. for the proposition that special
needs “exist in the public school context” because (a) the “warrant
requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed;” and (b) the
requirement of probable cause “would undercut the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools.”151 The Court did not make reference to any need for a
context-specific inquiry to determine whether the Vernonia schools

146

536 U.S. 822 (2002).
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648-49.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 652-53.
150
Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
151
Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
147
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presented special governmental needs.152 Rather, it treated this
language from T.L.O. as a bright line rule.
This bright line rule did not establish that random drug testing was
permissible in schools, because T.L.O. dealt with a search based on
individualized suspicion.153 Thus, the next inquiry of the Vernonia
Court was whether this special need would allow school officials to
conduct suspicionless searches. To answer this question, the Court
considered the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the
intrusion, the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, and
the efficacy of the means used to address the concern.154
In holding that a suspicionless search was justified, the Court
emphasized that, because the testing program affected schoolchildren,
the “most significant element” in its decision was that the school had
“responsibilities . . . as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care.”155 Further, the Court “caution[ed] against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing [would] readily pass constitutional muster in
other contexts.”156 In this cautionary paragraph, it contrasted the
context of a school, where one must ask whether the officials acted as
reasonable guardians, with the context of employment, where one
must ask whether the officials acted as reasonable employers.157
152

See id. at 653-54.
Id. at 653; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 344-46.
154
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-64. Although the Vernonia Court cited to
Skinner for the proposition that some suspicionless searches are acceptable, it did not
explicitly employ the test for whether a search can be reasonable in the absence of
suspicion that Skinner set forth (supra Part III(A)). See id. at 653-54. However, in
the course of its balancing test (which used factors articulated in similar language to
those used by the Krieg court), it explicitly addressed whether testing based on
suspicion would be practicable in public schools. See id. at 663-64. Though it used
the language of “efficacy,” it also addressed the inquiry of whether requiring
suspicion would frustrate the objective of the administrators. Id. In this discussion, it
pointed to parent resistance to suspicion-based testing, to possible unfair effects on
troubled children, and to the burden that would be posed on schoolteachers where
they are not trained in the duty of recognizing signs of drug use. Id.
155
Id. at 665.
156
Id.
157
Id.
153
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The next case addressing suspicionless drug testing in schools was
Earls.158 In that case, students in extracurricular activities again
challenged a random drug testing policy. The Earls Court started with
the bright line rule recognized in Vernonia: that “‘special needs’ inhere
in the public school context” such that probable cause may not be
necessary to justify a search.159 However, unlike the Court in
Vernonia, the Earls Court did not conduct a separate inquiry into
whether suspicionless searches could be reasonable. Instead, based on
the Vernonia proposition that in public schools “the ‘reasonableness’
inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
responsibility for children,”160 the Court asserted that “a finding of
individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school conducts
drug testing.”161
The Court clarified the meaning of this assertion later in its
opinion, when it rejected the students’ claim that drug testing
presumptively requires individualized suspicion by saying, “[i]n this
context, the Fourth Amendment does not require a finding of
individualized suspicion.”162 To support this response, the Court
referred the reader back to the section of its opinion regarding the
special needs inherent in schools.163
Thus, in sharp contrast to the cases of Skinner, Von Raab, and
Chandler, the Earls Court did not undertake a context-specific
balancing test to determine whether a departure from the normal
requirement of individualized suspicion could be justified by some
unusual circumstance. Instead, the Earls Court created a bright line
rule that individualized suspicion is not presumptively necessary in the
context of school drug tests, even though it is presumptively necessary
for other drug tests.164 Thus, the school context will—in effect—
158

Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
Id. at 829 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653).
160
Id. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 837.
163
Id.
164
See supra Parts III(A)-III(C).
159
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replace a balancing test that is weighted in favor of individual privacy
with one that is measured on an even scale.165
E. Summary of Supreme Court Treatment of Suspicionless Drug Tests
Skinner and Von Raab make clear that the fact that government
agents have a safety purpose for their drug testing program will not
obviate the need to determine whether those agents were justified in
departing from the requirement of individualized suspicion. Instead,
the Supreme Court will look to the circumstances surrounding the
safety concern for some reason that it would be impractical to require
individual suspicion.166
Further, the Chandler case has shown that not all safety concerns
are important enough to present a special governmental need. Instead,
the concerns that the testing program addresses must be real and
substantial. Finally, the Chandler Court explained that when it looks
for an unusual circumstance that will justify a suspicionless test, it will
consider whether there was a drug problem among the targeted group
of persons.167
By contrast, in the school context, the Supreme Court has
eliminated any presumption that individualized suspicion is required
before a drug testing program involving school children can be
reasonable. Instead, it allows courts to balance the interests of the
individual students against those of the school officials and to assess
the efficacy of those officials’ chosen method of drug deterrence
without any initial inquiry into whether the school’s needs could be
served by a suspicion-based program.168
165

This bright line rule does not mean that all drug testing in schools will be
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
However, it does allow courts to look directly to whether a reasonable guardian
would have acted as the school district did without first asking whether some
unusual circumstance justified the school district in disregarding general rule
requiring individualized suspicion.
166
Supra Parts III(A) and III(B).
167
Supra Part III(C).
168
Supra Part III(D).
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S BRIGHT LINE RULE CREATES SIGNIFICANT
POLICY CONCERNS
As shown above in Part II, the Krieg court treated the fact that the
City of Marion had a safety purpose for its drug testing program as
sufficient to eliminate any presumption that individualized suspicion
was required. Thus, it analyzed Krieg’s case in a manner more
appropriate to a school context than to a workplace. This was
inappropriate because, as shown above, the cases addressing drug
testing in schools have been premised almost entirely on the role of
school administrators as the guardians of the minor children for whom
they are responsible.169
Had it used the Skinner framework for evaluating workplace drug
testing by government agents, the Krieg court would have first
determined whether (a) the intrusion on Krieg’s privacy interest was
minimal, (b) the City’s interests were important, and (c) requiring
suspicion would have undermined the City’s objective.170 Only after
determining that this threshold was met would it have been possible
for the court to hold that the City’s suspicionless drug testing program
was reasonable. Instead, the Krieg court balanced the interests of
Krieg and the City on even scale, ignoring the presumption that when
the City chose a random drug testing program it chose an unreasonable
method of pursuing its interests.171
By omitting the analytical step of determining whether the special
need asserted by the government created some unusual circumstance
that would make the normal application of the Fourth Amendment
(requiring individualized suspicion at an absolute minimum)
impractical, the Seventh Circuit “un-tipped” a balance that normally
weighs in favor of individual privacy rights. This creates significant
policy concerns. First, it stretches a narrow exception to
169

See supra Part III(D).
Supra Part III(A); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 624 (1989).
171
See supra Part II for the reasoning used by the Krieg court.
170
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constitutionally-required protections to include a large number of bluecollar workers, without explaining why it was appropriate to do so.
Second, even if it were appropriate, the decision is not desirable in that
it undermines the goals of the Fourth Amendment. It does so by
diminishing the incentive for public employers to obtain public input
and to consider less intrusive means before implementing drug testing
programs that will affect large numbers of people.
A. The Seventh Circuit Expanded the Exception to the Supreme Court’s
Rule
As will be shown, the Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted the
safety concerns that will satisfy Skinner. This is not necessarily
incorrect. However, when paired with the bright line effect that the
Seventh Circuit has given to the Skinner test, the result is an exception
permitting suspicionless drug testing that threatens to swallow the rule.
In short, the Seventh Circuit has applied the concept of safetysensitive positions in a way that will include much of the blue-collar
public workforce. The Seventh Circuit has also interpreted Skinner,
Von Raab, Vernonia, and Earls to mean that, where a worker holds a
safety-sensitive position, a public employer can test that worker for
drug use without any need for individualized suspicion.172 Thus, the
general rule that an employer must have individualized suspicion to
test an employee for drug use will apply to far fewer people than it
would have if the court had applied the Skinner rule differently in the
Krieg decision.
Because of the widespread effect of its interpretation of Skinner,
and because this interpretation was not compelled by precedent, the
Krieg court should have explained why it was appropriate to adopt a
broad view of the types of safety concerns that will satisfy the Skinner
test.

172

Supra Part II.
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of Skinner Was Not Compelled
by Precedent
Consistent with Skinner, the Krieg court defined safety-sensitive
positions as those “fraught with such risks of injury to others that even
a momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous
consequences.”173 Using primarily district court cases from other
circuits, the court concluded that Krieg’s position was similar enough
to the other safety-sensitive positions for which random drug testing
had been allowed that a “reasonable jury would conclude” that Krieg
was a safety-sensitive employee.174
The Seventh Circuit cited first to appellate level cases from other
circuits about random drug testing in the aviation, rail, highway, and
water transportation industries, listing some of the employees covered
in these industries’ testing regimes.175 However, it did not mention any
similarities between the positions covered in those cases and Krieg’s
position as the operator of several types of heavy equipment, such as a
one-ton dump truck, a dump truck with a plow, a front end loader, and
a backhoe.176 The court then looked to two federal district court cases
and to a Michigan Supreme Court case, each of which involved heavy
equipment operators of some kind.177 Based on these cases, the
Seventh Circuit claimed that “[a] number of courts” agree that heavy
173

Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Skinner, 489
U.S. at 628) (bracketed material in original).
174
Id. at 518.
175
Bluestein v. Dep’t of Transp., 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990); Am. Fed’n
Gov’t Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989). These cases are
immediately distinguishable from the situation in Krieg because, like Skinner, they
involved testing regimes created by regulations or official orders that limited the
scope and circumstances of each drug test. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453; Am. Fed’n
Gov’t Employees, 885 F.2d at 886-88.
176
See Krieg, 481 F.3d at 518.
177
Id. (citing Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ,
C-89-4112-DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992);
Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Middlebrooks v.
Wayne County, 521 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1994)).
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equipment operators can create a threat to safety that is sufficient
under Skinner.178
The court next looked to federal district court cases in which
public employees’ positions were not safety-sensitive.179Two of those
cases held that workers such as mail van and shuttle bus drivers did
not satisfy the Skinner test. Krieg’s job was safety-sensitive because
Krieg operated equipment that was “larger and more difficult to
operate” than the equipment in those cases.180 The fact that he did not
operate this equipment in a rural area away from other vehicles and
pedestrians added to the safety-sensitive nature of Krieg’s job.181
The first case the Krieg court relied upon was American
Federation of Government Employees v. Cheney, an unpublished case
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.182 In Cheney, civilian employees of the Navy challenged
the Navy’s Drug-Free Workplace Plan, which was created in
compliance with President Reagan’s Executive Order requiring all
federal agencies to create programs to eliminate drugs from their
workplace.183 The Navy’s program included random testing for certain
categories of employees.184 All employees were subject to testing in
the aftermath of an accident and to testing based on individualized
suspicion.185
The Cheney court asserted that, in addition to balancing private
interests against governmental interests in order to determine whether
random drug testing was permissible, a court must also find that “there
178

Id.
Id. (citing Burka v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 751 F. Supp. 441, 443-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766,
770 (D.D.C. 1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Lyng, 706 F. Supp. 934, 947
(D.D.C. 1988)).
180
Id. (referring to Watkins and Lyng).
181
Id.
182
Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-89-4112DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992).
183
Id. at *1.
184
Id.
185
Id.
179
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is a clear, direct nexus between the nature of the employee’s duties and
the compelling governmental interest articulated by the
government.”186 Throughout its opinion, the court emphasized that
jobs that were “no more dangerous” than “traditional blue-collar
tasks” would not raise safety concerns of the “significant level”
required to justify a suspicionless search.187
On a motion for summary judgment, the court held that the
government had not shown that the duties of forklift operators, tractor
operators, road sweeper operators, and engineering equipment
operators had a sufficient nexus to its interest in safety.188 Instead,
among those challenged, the only category of employees from the
“Transportation Mobile Equipment Operators Family” of employees
that did have the requisite nexus to safety was crane operators.189
Unlike the other types of heavy equipment operators, crane operators
lifted large loads above the ground, creating an opportunity for true
disaster.190 By contrast, the other operators did not create exceptional
safety concerns because they drove their vehicles at “slower speeds
than automobiles” and normally did not drive on public roads.191Thus,
the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to all
of the mobile equipment operators except for the crane operators.192
186

Id. at *2.
Id. at **11-12. Most pipefitters, riggers, and shipwrights performed tasks
that were no more dangerous than ordinary blue-collar work. Id. The court
emphasized elsewhere in its opinion that “[w]ork with machinery does not
automatically carry with it the risk of unpredictable catastrophic accidents.” Id. at
*12. In all, the court analyzed thirteen different “families” of positions within the
Navy’s civilian workforce; these families were grouped by duties and were titled
“plumbing family,” “metal work family,” “electrician work group,” and the like. The
court held that eight of these families were not safety-sensitive or were defined in a
manner that included too many non-safety-sensitive workers. Three families were
safety-sensitive. The court parsed the remaining two families, holding that some
positions within those families were safety-sensitive and others were not.
188
Id. at *13.
189
Id. at **13-14.
190
Id. at *13.
191
Id.
192
Id. at *14.
187
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The next case Krieg relied upon was Plane v. United States, from
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan.193 In that case, civilian employees of the Defense Logistics
Agency sought summary judgment in their challenge of that agency’s
Drug-Free Workplace Plan, which required certain groups of
employees to undergo random drug testing.194 These employees
included forklift operators, tractor operators, engineering operators,
and crane operators.195 In holding that the duties of these employees
presented a sufficient nexus to the government’s safety concern, the
court emphasized that the jobs at issue involved using heavy
equipment to lift and move thousands of pounds to heights ranging
from fourteen to fifty feet, and that some of the positions involved
operating cutting torches near “fuel cells and other hazardous
devices.”196 The court then held that the dangers to safety that these
jobs presented were sufficient to justify random drug testing.197 The
court did not explain why the magnitude of these harms was
“disastrous” within the meaning of Skinner; it only explained that the
harms that could result were “immediate.”198
Finally, the Krieg court drew support from Middlebrooks v. Wayne
County, in the Supreme Court of Michigan,199 for its claim that heavy
equipment operators can create safety risks that are sufficient under
193

Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
Id. at 1070-71.
195
Id. at 1075.
196
Id. at 1075-76. Forklift operators might lift up to 10,000 pounds, tractor
operators tow trailers through narrow passages and other difficult to navigate spaces
and thus must make sure that all couplings are secure and that speed, clearance, and
weight limitations are observed, crane operators lift up to 50 tons, engineering
operators operate the cutting torches, and some of these jobs also involve operating a
bulldozer. Id.
197
Id. at 1077. Operators could drop their loads onto a fellow employee,
hazardous materials could be released by a cutting torch accident, trailers towed by a
tractor could tip over while navigating a narrow passage, equipment operators may
back over someone while not looking, etc. Id.
198
See id. (concluding that the harms were “immediate” and deciding, without
reasoning, that they were “quite significant”).
199
521 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1994).
194
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Skinner to justify testing without individualized suspicion. The
holding in Middlebrooks provides the strongest support for the
conclusion that Krieg’s job was safety-sensitive, because the plaintiff
in Middlebrooks operated several of the same kinds of machines that
Krieg operated. There, the plaintiff was an applicant for a position
with the Wayne County Road Commission that would require him to
operate “a riding lawn mower on highway medians and
embankments,” to drive “dump trucks carrying equipment” between
road commission work sites and repair facilities, and to operate a front
end loader.200
The court emphasized that the safety risks involved in the job for
which Mr. Middlebrooks applied were more significant than those
inherent in the operation of motor vehicles by the general public,
because he would be operating this heavy equipment on the medians
and embankments of roads designed for cars, vans, and trucks
traveling at high rates of speed.201 The court balanced these safety
concerns against the diminished expectation of privacy that occurred
when Mr. Middlebrooks applied for a job that he knew required drug
testing—and when he, in fact, consented to the test.202 It then
concluded that it was appropriate to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that
Wayne County violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it tested
his urine for illegal drugs.203
In Middlebrooks, the court recognized that federal courts have not
uniformly agreed that heavy equipment operation creates a safety risk
of sufficient magnitude to justify drug testing without individualized
suspicion, under the Skinner standard.204 The Middlebrooks court
lengthens its list of courts that have held in favor of testing heavy
equipment operators by including cases regarding drivers of passenger

200

Id. at 775.
Id. at 779-80.
202
Id. at 778-80.
203
Id. at 779.
204
Id. at 778-79.
201
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vehicles, but the authority that it cites directly is limited to two
cases—one of which is the Plane case discussed above.205
Therefore, the cases on which the Seventh Circuit relied to
conclude that Krieg’s position was safety-sensitive within the meaning
of Skinner reveal only the following: First, one district court has held
that most heavy equipment operators fall outside the “safety-sensitive”
designation, but that crane operators fall within that title because they
lift heavy loads high in the air.206 Second, another district court held
that several heavy equipment operators created safety risks that were
“immediate” because they lifted heavy loads high in the air, moved
heavy loads through difficult-to-manage passages, or operated cutting
torches near explosive devices.207 Third, a state court held that
operating certain kinds of heavy equipment—the same kinds that
Krieg operated—on highway medians or on highways created a safety
risk within the meaning of Skinner.208 And finally, lower federal courts
overall have been divided about whether heavy equipment operation is
a safety-sensitive task within the meaning of Skinner.209
All together, these cases do not justify the Seventh Circuit in
resting on a simple assertion that courts have “upheld drug testing of
heavy equipment operators” and have limited the groups that can be
drug tested by excluding persons who drive mail vans and shuttle
busses.210 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s decision to include Krieg within
the class of safety-sensitive employees was neither required by
precedent nor supported by uniform persuasive authority. The Seventh
Circuit announced its agreement with a rule that heavy equipment
operators are safety-sensitive employees within the meaning of
Skinner without ever addressing the fact that persuasive authorities
were divided about whether they should be.
205

Id. at 779 nn.25, 26.
See Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-894112-DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992).
207
See Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
208
See Middlebrooks, 521 N.W.2d 774.
209
See id.
210
Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2007).
206
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2. The Seventh Circuit’s Broad Interpretation of Skinner Will Have
Widespread Effect
Because the Seventh Circuit employed a broader application of
the Skinner concept of safety-sensitive employees than did some
federal courts, it should have explained why it was adopting the
broader view. Beyond the need for reasoned judicial opinions, this
failure on the part of the court is particularly severe because the effect
of this application was to create a bright line rule211 excepting a large
number of public employees from a constitutionally-required
protection.
While not every blue-collar worker operates heavy machinery, the
Seventh Circuit makes clear in Krieg that blue-collar workers other
than heavy equipment operators have safety-sensitive positions as
well. The court lists, as representatives of some of the other groups of
safety-sensitive employees, workers in the aviation, rail, highway, and
water transportation industries.212 Blue-collar workers account for
approximately 245,000 of the federal government’s 1.75 million
employees.213 That is about 14% of the federal workforce. Add to
these all of the blue-collar workers employed by State and local
governments, and the result is a sizable portion of the public
workforce.
While there are many instances in which members of the public
will be subject to suspicionless searches of some kind—such as airport
screenings and business inspections—each of these exceptions has

211

See supra Part II.
Krieg, 481 F.3d at 518.
213
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFGE At A Glance, http://www.afge.org/
Index.cfm?Page=AFGEFacts (last visited Dec. 6, 2007); Stephen Barr, Eagerly
Anticipated Raises for Blue-Collar Workers Are a Tangle, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2004, at B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A447712004Mar9?language=printer.
212
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been the result of significant discussion on the part of the courts.214
Each has its own narrowly drawn limits and each expansion of such
exception is in effect “tampering with the scales of justice” in an area
of law in which a “citizen’s interest in freedom” is supposed to be
given additional weight.215
The Seventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted the limits of the
exception for workplace drug testing by removing any weight on the
side of a requirement of individualized suspicion.216 Theoretically
problematic on its own, this mistake became disastrous when the court
additionally held, without adequate explanation, that large numbers of
ordinary blue-collar workers are subject to that exception. This failure
is particularly troublesome because one of the three cases on which the
Seventh Circuit relied makes clear that the safety exception should not
be construed in a manner that will encompass ordinary blue-collar
workers.217
B. A Lost Incentive for Non-Governmental Input and for Less Intrusive
Means
Even if it was appropriate for the Seventh Circuit to expand the
safety exception in this way, it is not at all clear that this expansion is
desirable. This is because the policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment favor the encouragement of methods whereby
government agents seek input from the public or from the targets of
searches before conducting those searches.
For example, one purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
citizens against intrusions on their privacy where those intrusions are

214

See supra Part I for an introduction to these exceptions. See also Mich.
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) (safety-based checkpoint
stops rely on different precedent than do safety-based workplace drug tests).
215
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216
See supra Part II.
217
Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-89-4112DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388, **11-12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992).
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not justified at the outset by some legitimate governmental interest.218
This purpose is better served when unreasonable searches are
prevented than when such searches are merely punished or stopped.219
Input from the public or from the intended subjects of a search could
help government bodies become aware of potential problems with
their intended drug testing programs. For example, there might be
reasons why a particular group should be excluded from testing220 or
why a particular collection protocol is worrisome. Discovering these
problems before the testing program is implemented could both
decrease the need for litigation and promote the Fourth Amendment
policy of preventing unnecessary intrusion.
Public input also serves the purpose that underlies the warrant
requirement: ensuring that a neutral body determines the scope of the
justified intrusion by describing the persons, places, and things to be
affected.221 If the government and the individuals to be affected
discuss these terms before a testing program is implemented, then they
can potentially reach an agreement about what kind of testing program
is reasonable. This might include not only the time, place, and persons
involved, but could also include a discussion of less intrusive
alternatives to random testing. This agreement may not be “neutral,”
but it will represent both interested parties rather than only one.
Clearly, the Fourth Amendment does not require such input. However,
input of this kind promotes the interests that underlie the law.
218

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
219
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (discussing the need for a
“deterrent safeguard” to protect the Fourth Amendment), abrogated in part by
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
220
See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677-78
(1989) (upholding a testing program with regard to one group of Customs Service
employees but remanding for further information as to the need for testing all
employees in a separate group).
221
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989).
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The City of Marion apparently believed that there was some
benefit to receiving input from the workers of the Department of
Streets and Sanitation about the City’s drug testing policy. The City
had bargained with the union representing those employees and signed
a collective bargaining agreement that allowed the City to test workers
for drugs after accidents and upon reasonable suspicion.222 Further, the
parties had negotiated a personnel handbook that allowed the City to
test “safety-sensitive” employees—those who held a commercial
driver’s license or operated commercial motor vehicles—on a random
basis.223
Nonetheless, the City unilaterally adopted a new handbook that
re-defined “safety-sensitive” employees to include all employees with
duties “related to the safe operation of City equipment.”224 The union
and the employees represented by it refused to agree to these terms,
but the City implemented them anyway.225 Krieg fell within this new
category of safety-sensitive employees.226 Therefore, in essence,
Krieg’s termination and subsequent lawsuit was the result of the City’s
decision to back out of the deal that it had made with its employees
about what kinds of searches were permissible.
Does the Fourth Amendment provide redress for such bad
behavior? Of course not. But when the City chose to bargain with the
employees, it obtained their consent227 before conducting an intrusive
222

Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 515.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 515-16.
227
Here, the author uses this term “consent” in its more colloquial sense. Krieg
argued that because Indiana unions do not have the benefit of certain public
employee collective bargaining laws available in other states, the union in this case
could not have waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches even if it had agreed to random drug testing of non-CDL holders.
Nonetheless, Krieg agreed that some unions do have the power to waive employees’
rights. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Robert Krieg and American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 3063, 2006 WL
3098735, at **14-17, Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007).
223
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search. When it unilaterally adopted a different policy with regard to
such searches, the result was that employees felt—correctly or
incorrectly—that the intrusion was unjustified.228
By condoning the City’s behavior in the Krieg case, the Seventh
Circuit has diminished the incentive for the City to bargain in the
future. If the City can implement a random drug testing program
without showing that it is the only workable way to address its safety
concerns, then it will have little incentive to engage in the lengthy and
costly process of bargaining with its employees about whether and to
what extent such a program is necessary. Where before the City sought
the union’s input into which employees should be subject to random
testing, it has now been told that it need not bother.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to consider Krieg a safetysensitive employee was not wrong. However, because the Seventh
Circuit incorrectly asserted that safety-sensitive employees can be
subject to suspicionless drug testing as long as the interests promoted
by the testing program outweigh the employees’ privacy interests, the
overall result of the court’s decision in Krieg was problematic. First, it
misconstrues Supreme Court precedent in a way that confuses the
context of a public workplace with that of a public school. This
confusion created a bright line rule in an area where the Supreme
Court has required a fact-sensitive inquiry. Second, the result of this
confusion was that the court failed to inquire whether departure from
the Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion was
228

This effect can be seen in Krieg’s reaction to the unannounced drug test that
precipitated this lawsuit. Krieg first refused to submit to the test, and then
immediately tried to call his union attorney. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 515-16. One can infer
that Krieg did not believe that the City was permitted to test him in the manner it
was asserting that it could. As a result, the City had to resort to threats to call police
before Krieg would leave the premises. Id. If the City had resolved its differences
with its employees through bargaining, then Krieg would have known that whatever
options his boss presented to him were the same options that he would hear from his
union representative. If nothing else, this would have the value of reassuring Krieg
that he was not being unfairly singled-out or otherwise mistreated.
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justified by the safety concerns that the City of Marion raised. Third,
this failure undermines incentives for bargaining with public
employees with regard to the conditions that will trigger drug testing.
Such bargaining is desirable because it promotes the goals of the
Fourth Amendment itself.
Because when the court labeled Krieg a safety-sensitive employee
it did not include a principled reason to distinguish him from other
heavy equipment operators or from large numbers of other kinds of
blue-collar workers, these problematic results will be far-reaching in
effect, if the Seventh Circuit does not remedy its mistakes.
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